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Huff: A Further Inquiry into the Quality of Indigent Felony Defense.

A FURTHER INQUIRY INTO THE QUALITY
OF INDIGENT FELONY DEFENSE
RICHARD L. HUFF*

One of the primary goals of a democracy is equality before the
law for all of its citizens. In order to attain this goal, the indigent criminal defendant must be afforded the same quality of representation as
the accused who can afford retained counsel.' Such a requirement is
mandated if societal confidence in the judicial system is to be maintained. The lack of such equality not only fosters a contempt for the
judicial process, but also can lead to a serious distrust in the authority
of the state itself.
Even though the American adversary system is not necessarily the
ideal form,2 it is the system employed in our criminal courts. Those
charged with crimes have not chosen the adversary system, but nevertheless, their futures are prescribed under it. The complexities of the
criminal law, including trial tactics, the law of evidence, constitutional
law, and criminal procedure, make it necessary for the adversaries to
be of approximately equal skill, if justice is to be the end product. Due
to experience, prosecutors almost uniformly exhibit a high degree of
competence, therefore, the variable in the system of criminal justice
is often the ability of the defense attorney. For the adversary system
to function as designed,' and therefore justice and fairness to result,
defense attorneys must exhibit a high degree of competence. 4
* Assistant Professor in Health Care, Graduate Faculty, Baylor University; J.D.
Hastings College of Law; B.A., Stanford University; Member of the California Bar.
1. See Bazelon, The Defective Assistance of Counsel, 42 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 5
(1973). Justice Black's opinion in Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) states:
"There can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends upon the
amount of money he has." Id. at 19.
2. For a discussion of the weaknesses of the adversary system, see J. FRANK,
COURTS ON TRIAL:

MYTH AND REALITY IN AMERICAN JUSTICE

80-107 (1949).

3. The 1974 President of the American Bar Association has stated that the adversary system is a great system when the adversaries are equal, but too often this is not
the case. Interview by J. Star, Chesterfield Smith: The Lawyers, Intellectual Digest,
(March, 1974), 21-23.
4. The New York Court of Appeals has stated that assistance of counsel "deals
neither with a shadowy figure standing beside the accused nor an abstract idea. It
envisages a lawyer, skilled in advocacy, a match for the prosecutor, and in full control
of the management of the defense at the trial." People v. De Renzzio, 277 N.Y.S.2d
688, 671 (1966).
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Although the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
United States provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused
Shall enjoy the right. . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense," only since 1963 has the Supreme Court held this right to be
so fundamental as to require the states to provide, at their own expense, counsel for the indigent defendant in all felony trials.5 Many
jurisdictions, including Bexar County, Texas, 'have chosen to fulfill this
obligation by -the utilization of a system of assigning members of the
local bar in rotation to represent indigent felony defendants. An analysis of Bexar County's method of providing criminal defense services
to indigents will provide insight into one jurisdiction's attempt to meet
this problem. The evaluation of ,the quality of indigent defense services under this system will illustrate the extent to which Bexar County
has approached the goal of equal justice-in a sense it may be considered exemplary of the degree of success or failure of many assigned
counsel systems throughout the nation. Therefore, narrowly stated,
the purpose of this article is to show that Bexar County's system of assigned counsel provides adequate representation for indigents-a finding contrary to the prevailing view.
In order to support such a finding, several preliminary issues require consideration. As a foundation for the inquiry, the evolution, extent, and standards of adequacy of the right to counsel must be
examined; the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States, the judicial interpretations of it, and the statutes of the State
of Texas will serve as sources.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL

It is a highly doubtful proposition that the framers of the Constitution and its appurtenant Bill of Rights intended the sixth amendment's right to counsel to be a requirement upon the states to provide
gratis counsel to an indigent criminal defendant. ' In all likelihood it
was intended to be a prohibition of the practice followed in some English courts of denying an accused the opportunity of being represented
by his retained attorney, or any attorney at all. 7 The case of Powell
5. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
6. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 464-66 (1942).
7. Id. at 464-66; Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). William M. Beany,
describing the right to counsel in colonial America, has observed that
Connecticut in its practice far surpassed the English custom, and its courts ap-

pointed counsel in all cases where an accused needed and could not retain counsel.
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v. Alabama 8 germinated the modern concept of the right to counsel.
In Powell the Supreme Court reversed a state conviction of rape with
a sentence of death imposed upon five black youths for whom the trial
judge had appointed the entire county bar to provide their defense.
No one attorney was charged with the duty of defending them and no
pretrial preparation was made. The last minute appointment of an attorney at the time of trial, and his pro 'forma appearance, resulted in
the Court stating that the "defendants were not accorded the right of
counsel in any substantial sense."' In holding that the defendants were
deprived of a fair trial as required by the due process clause of the
14th amendment, the Court touched upon the history of the sixth
amendment, 'but emphasized the basic unfairness of a procedure
whereby five ignorant and friendless youths were pitted against a
learned and experienced prosecutor with their lives literally hanging in
the balance. The Court's stress upon the need for a "fair trial" under
the 14th amendment's due process clause, rather than upon the sixth
amendment's right to counsel, influenced the development of the indigent's right to representation over the next 30 years.
In 1938 the Supreme Court held that the sixth amendment required the appointment of counsel for all indigents tried in the federal
courts,'" but 4 years -latera different criterion was applied to state trials.
In Betts v. Brady" the Court held -that the sixth amendment did not
require the states to provide counsel for all those who cannot afford
it themselves, in the absence of special circumstances. 12 During the
following 20 years, the Court decided numerous cases setting out some
sixteen "special circumstances" relating to the age of the accused, his
mental capacity, the complexity of the case, whether the case was a
capital one, among others. A "fair trial" could still be had without the
assistance of counsel.
Finally in 1963 the Supreme Court abandoned the "special circumstances" rule by overruling Betts in Gideon v. Wainwright,'8 hold-

ing that
Three colonies, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and Delaware, went part way, and
stated that in capital cases an accused should have counsel upon request.
W. BEANY, THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN AMERICAN COUiRTS 25 (1955).

8. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
9. Id.at 58.
10. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
11. 316 U.S.455 (1942).
12. Id.at 462.
13. 372 U.S. 335 (1962). For a detailed discussion of the background of the case
as it wound its way through the Supreme Court culminating in Gideon's acquittal on
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reason and reflection require us to recognize that in our adver-

sary system of criminal justice, any person haled into court, who
is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot
be assured of a fair trial un14
less counsel is provided for him.
In June of 1972, the Supreme Court, in Argersinger v. Hamlin,15 expanded the Gideon rule, which applied only to felonies, to all cases in

which imprisonment may be imposed.'"

The trial judge is now

required to provide each indigent with "the guiding hand of counsel"

in all felony cases, and misdemeanor cases as well, if in his opinion
the case may result in a jail sentence.
It should be mentioned that the right to counsel has been held
to apply to times other than during trial. An indigent has this right
during all other "critical stages" of the criminal justice process: during
an interrogation,' 7 arraignment,' 8 post-charge -lineup identification, 9
preliminary hearing,"0 sentencing, 2 1 imposition of deferred sentence or
probation revocation under some circumstances, 2 2 appeal,2" and during
juvenile proceedings.24
While the United States Supreme Court has set out these "critical
stages" at which an indigent must be afforded counsel it has been reticent to delineate the standards of adequacy of that requirement. Al-

though the Court has stated that "[t]he Constitution's guaranty of assis-

tance of counsel cannot be satisfied by mere formal appointment, ' 25
it has been interpreted by one court as a "procedural requirement, as
retrial, this time with the assistance of counsel, see A. LEWIS, GIDEON'S TRUMPET
:(1964).
14. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1962).
15. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
16. Id. at 37.
17. Id. at 37. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 464-65 (1966); cf. Massiah v.
United States, 377 'U.S. 201, 206 (1964) (testimony elicited from defendant without his
knowledge while free on bail inadmissible).
18. Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 54 (1961).
19. Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 272 (1967); 'United States v. Wade, 388
U.S. 218, 227 (1967). But see Ellsworth v. State, 447 S.W.2d 170 (Tex. Crim. App.
1969) (lack of counsel did not deny defendant due process in that there was nothing
in the record to indicate that the lineup confrontation was suggestive or tainted).
20. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 401, 403 (1965) (Texas examining trial); White
v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963).
21. Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 740-41 (1948).
22. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 786-87 (1973); Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S.
128, 137 (1967).
23. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357 (1963). But see Ross v. Moffit, U.S. -, 94 S. Ct. 2437, - L. Ed. 2d - (1974). Ross limits the scope of this guarantee to appeals as a matter of right. Id. at -, 94 S. Ct. at 2443, - L. Ed. 2d at -.
24. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 41 (1967).
25. Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444, 446 (1940).
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contrasted with a standard of skill."' 26 As such, the courts are only to

be concerned with whether or not there was an operative appointment,
that is, one in which there was sufficient time to prepare and no conflict of interest. Judge Prettyman, the originator of this position, stated
that the Supreme Court "has not itself undertaken, nor has it imposed
upon the inferior federal courts, the duty of appraising the quality of
a defense." 27 This view has come under heavy criticism' 8 for it is now
generally accepted that at least some degree of adequacy is required.
The early trend, and probably still the majority rule, in the state and
lower federal courts is to require only that the defense counsel's action
did not reduce the trial to a sham, farce, or mockery of justice.2 9 Such
a test of adequacy places a heavy burden on the defendant." °
Several jurisdictions have recently adopted a purportedly more liberal test of the standard of adequacy. In 1961 the Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit departed from the "mockery of justice" rule when
it stated the applicable test to be "not errorless counsel, and not counsel
judged ineffective by hindsight, but counsel reasonably likely to render
and rendering reasonably effective assistance."'" In 1964, the Fifth
26. Mitchell v. United States, 259 F.2d 787, 790 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S.
850 (1958).
27. Id. at 790.
28. Waltz, Inadequacy of Trial Defense Representation as a Ground for Post Conviction Relief in Criminal Cases, 59 Nw. U.L. REV. 289, 293-95 (1964); see Michel
v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91 (1955).
29. W. LOCKHART, Y. KAMISAR, & I. CHOPER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES-COMMENTS-QUESTIONS 601 (3d ed. 1970); Note, The Right to Counsel and the Neophyte
Attorney, 24 RUTGERS L. REV. 378, 380-81 & nf. 13-16 (1970). See generally Bazelon,
The Defective Assistance of Counsel, 42 U. CIN. L. REV. 1 (1973); Finer, Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel, 58 CORNELL L. REV. 1077 (1973); Grano, The Right to Counsel:
CollateralIssues Affecting Due Process, 54 MINN. L. REV. 1175 (1970); Katz, Gideon's
Trumpet: Mournful and Muffled, 55 IOWA L. REV. 523 (1970); Waltz, Inadequacy of
Trial Defense Representation as a Ground for Post-Conviction Relief in Criminal Cases,
59 Nw. U.L. REV. 289 (1964); Comment, Incompetency of Counsel, 25 BAYLOR L. REV.
299 (1973); Comment, The Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel, 42 Miss. L. REV.
213 (1971); Comment, Effective Assistance of Counsel, 14 S.D.L. REV. 287 (1969).
30. Bazelon, The Defective Assistance of Counsel, 42 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 29 (1973).
Adding to this burden is the presumption or assumption of many courts that the defense
was adequate. See United States v. Katz, 425 F.2d 928 (2d Cir. 1970) (defense counsel
sleeping during examination of co-defendant not prejudicial); United States v. Ragen.
176 F.2d 579 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 809 (1949) (membership in bar in good
standing held to be prima facie evidence of competence); Hill v. State, 393 S.W.2d 901
(Tex. Crim. App. 1965) (counsel whose bar dues had lapsed, but were later repaid, held
to have been competent). But see McKinzie v. Ellis, 287 F.2d 549 (5th Cir. 1961)
(attorney whose bar dues had lapsed held not competent). For an example of a finding
of inadequacy based on lack of bar membership, see Lunce v. Dowd, 261 F.2d 351 (7th
Cir. 1958), aff'g Lunce v. Overlade, 244 F.2d 108 (7th Cir. 1957) (Indiana attorney
incompetent in Ohio state prosecution).
31. MacKenner v. Ellis, 280 F.2d 592, 599, modified, 289 F.2d 928 (5th Cir. 1960),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 877 (1961). For Texas cases applying this test, see Ex parte
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Circuit clarified and redefined the standard of adequacy for indigent
defense counsel, holding that their representation must be "at least
equal to that expected from compensated counsel of an accused's own
choosing." 2 The standard adopted by the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia in 1967 at first appears to be a variant of the mockery of justice rule: ineffective representation is shown when the defense counsel's "gross incompetence . . . blotted out the essence of a
substantial defense." 3
Judge Bazelon has observed that this test
permits the defendant to focus upon a single defense, rather than being
forced to attack the entire proceeding. 4 In 1968 the Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit articulated its test, not by enunciating a general
formula, but by enumerating specific principles which must be satisfied
in order to find adequate representation:
Counsel for an indigent defendant should be appointed promptly. Counsel should be afforded a reasonable opportunity to prepare to defend an acused. Counsel must confer with his client
without undue delay and as often as necessary, to advise him of
his rights and to elicit matters of defense or to ascertain that potential defenses are unavailable. Counsel must conduct appropriate investigations, both factual and legal, to determine if matters of defense can be developed, and to allow himself enough
time for reflection and preparation for trial.3 5
If a failure to abide by these requirements is shown, the burden shifts
to the prosecution to establish that no prejudice resulted. 36
Professor Grano has observed that the differences between the
mockery of justice test and the standards followed by the Fourth, Fifth,
and District of Columbia Circuits are more illusory than real. 37 His
analysis of the conflicting holdings leads to the conclusion that the
courts "seem to proceed on a case by case basis, recognizing that the
Smith, 463 S.W.2d 185 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971); Newton v. State, 456 S.W.2d 939 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1970).
32. Johnson v. United States, 328 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1964); accord, Calloway v.
Powell, 393 F.2d 886, 888 (5th Cir. 1968).
33. Bruce v. United States, 379 F.2d 113, 117 (D.C. Cir. 1967); accord, Scott v.

United States, 427 F.2d 609 (D.C. Cir. 1970). Both cases specifically disapprove of
the farce or mockery of justice criteria, stating that such language is only illustrative
of the defendant's heavy burden, not to be taken literally.
34. Bazelon, The Defective Assistance of Counsel, 42 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 29 (1973).
35.

Coles v. Peyton, 389 F.2d 224, 226 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 849

(1968).
36. Id. at 226.
37.

Grano, The Right to Counsel: Collateral Issues Affecting Due Process, 54

MINN. L. REV. 1175, 1242 (1970); see Beasely v. United States, 491 F.2d 687, 692 (6th
Cir. 1974).
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guidelines are too indefinite to distinguish the effective from the ineffective, the competent from the incompetent and the diligent from the
38
indifferent.
Subsequent to the publication of Professor Grano's views, two
courts have significantly increased the requirements for defense counsel competency. Both of these courts have addressed the issue of ade-

quacy in relation to what is expected of a reasonably prudent criminal
law attorney.

The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in

1970 held that the standard applied in other professions, that of the
customary skill and knowledge which normally prevails in that profes-

sion at that time and place, should also be applied to the criminal

courts. 9 Specifically it should be the "same level of competency as
that generally afforded at the bar to fee-paying clients."40 The most
far reaching decision on this subject is Beasley v. United States,4 de-

cided by the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in February of
1974. After rejecting the farce and mockery of justice rules, -the Court

held that
[i]t is a violation of this standard for defense counsel to deprive
a criminal defendant of a substantial defense by his own ineffectiveness or incompetence. . . . Defense counsel must perform at
38. Grano, The Right to Counsel. Collateral Issues Affecting Due Process, 54
MINN. L. REV. 1175, 1242 (1970).
39. Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d 730, 736 (3d Cir. 1970). Perhaps such a
change could have been predicted as early as 1967 when the court stated that
[a]s the concept of the Sixth Amendment right has broadened to encompass the
provision of counsel for indigents, so too the standards to which appointing courts
and appointed counsel must adhere have become more exacting.
Fields v. Peyton, 375 F.2d 624, 628 (4th Cir. 1967).
The standard approved here has been strongly advocated. ABA STANDARDS RELATING
TO PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES

in trial practice"); L.

27 (Approved Draft 1968)

("experienced and active

SILVERSTEIN, DEFENSE OF THE PRIOR IN AMERICAN STATE COURTS

17 (1965) ("standard of a reasonably competent retained attorney"); Finer, Ineffective
("the normal and customary degree of skill possessed by attorneys who are fairly skilled in the criminal law
Assistance of Counsel, 58 CORNELL L. REV. 1077, 1080 (1973)

and who have a fair amount of experience at the criminal bar").
For a discussion of this standard found in cases brought under the Civil Rights Act

of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) see Woods v. Virginia, 320 F. Supp. 1227 (W.D. Va.
1971); Vance v. Robinson, 292 F. Supp. 786 (W.D.N.C. 1968); Reinke v. Richardson,
279 F. Supp. 155 (E.D. Wis. 1968); Jackson v. Hader, 271 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Mo.
1967); Pritt v. Johnson, 264 F. Supp. 167 (M.D. Pa. 1967); Puglian v. Staziak, 231 F.
Supp. 347 (W.D. Pa. 1964). All are examples of federal courts refusing to find state
action in the appointment of and defense provided by counsel for indigents. One writer
has concluded, however, that Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal
Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), may portend a different result. Note, The
Right of the Indigent Client to Sue His Court-Appointed Attorney for Malpractice, 33
LA. L.REV. 740 (1973).

40. Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d 730, 736 (3d Cir. 1970).
41. 491 F.2d 687 (6th Cir. 1974).
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least as well as a lawyer with ordinary training and skill in the

criminal law and must conscientiously protect his client's interest,
undeflected by conflicting considerations.42

It therefore would seem that if an indigent defendant is to receive equal
protection under the law, he must be afforded the same opportunity
to procure defense counsel services as ,the man of wealth who is tried
in a criminal court. Criminal defendants of means do not merely hire
good attorneys, they hire good criminal law attorneys to defend -them.

If 'the trend toward equal protection, as required by the Courts of
Appeals for the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits is to be satisfied, it
is incumbent upon society to provide a system whereby indigent criminal defendants are represented at a level equivalent to that expected

of a reasonably prudent criminal law practitioner.

For this reason, it

is necessary to examine the manner in which courts have treated the

issue of inexperience as an element of adequacy or competency.
The appellate courts have generally been less than sympathetic to
claims of inadequate representation based on the inexperience of
counsel.4 3 It has frequently been held that the defense counsel's lack
of experience, standing alone, is not indicative of inadequacy of representation."1 But the courts do consider the number of years an

attorney has been practicing as a factor in bolstering a finding of adequacy." ' Such a view, at least on the issue of inadequacy, is not neces-

sarily unreasonable when viewing convictions on a case by case basis.
It is certainly possible for an attorney inexperienced in the criminal law
42. Id. at 696 (emphasis added).
43. Stevens v. Warden, 382 F.2d 429, 431 (4th Cir. 1967); Spaulding v. United
States, 279 F.2d 65, 66 (9th Cir. 1960); Anderson v. Bannon, 250 F.2d 654, 655 (6th
Cir. 1958). An excellent example of this view can be found in Alire v. United States,
365 F.2d 278 (10th Cir. 1966), in which the court upheld the conviction even though
the trial defense attorney testified at the habeas corpus evidentiary hearing that he had
been in practice for just 1 year, practicing exclusively in real estate law and would not
have wanted an attorney of his experience defending him if he were tried. Id. at 279.
44. See Stinnett v. Commonwealth, 468 S.W.2d 784 (Ky. 1971), where the court
held that
[t]he bare fact that the fifteen attorneys [out of eighty in the county] making up
the list [of appointed counsel] are the youngest members of the bar does not ipso
facto mean that they are incapable or ineffective.
Id. at 786 (court's emphasis). Similarly, the Illinois Court of Appeals has stated that
"[w]hile it is true that inexperience may result in incompetence, it is not necessarily
equated with it." People v. Gonzales, 239 N.E.2d 783, 787 (Ill. 1968).
For examples of inadequate defense based on inexperience plus other factors, see In
re Parker, 297 F. Supp. 367, 369 (D.S.D. 1969); Smotherman v. Beto, 276 F. Supp. 579,
590 (N.D. Tex. 1967); Ex parte Larkin, 420 S.W.2d 958, 959 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967);
Rodriguez v. State, 340 S.W.2d 61, 63 (Tex. Crim. App. 1960).
45. Johnson v. United States, 380 F.2d 810, 812 (10th Cir. 1967); Opie v.
Meacham, 293 F. Supp. 647, 650 (D. Wyo. 1968); Prince v. State, 461 S.W.2d 413, 415
"
(Tex. Crim. App. 1970).
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to represent a client as well as one who is a criminal law specialist. Although it is possible, it would not seem likely. Such an approach by
appellate courts may have a valid basis in that their function is to ensure that each individual who is convicted was adequately represented
by counsel. Conversely, it may be a questionable approach when
adopted by a legislative body whose duty it is to establish a system
whereby it is likely that each indigent tried will receive adequate
counsel.
It is submitted that the constitutional measure of the adequacy of
indigent criminal defense should be that which is equivalent to the representation provided by retained attorneys. Therefore, it is appropriate to examine the structure and functioning of Bexar County's
system of providing indigent representation.
BEXAR COUNTY'S SYSTEM OF PROVIDING COUNSEL

FOR INDIGENT FELONY DEFENDANTS

There are two general forms for providing indigent criminal defense in the United States-defender systems and assigned counsel
systems. The defender systems are those in which attorneys are hired
full or part time to provide defense services on a continuing basis to
all those unable to afford retained counsel. They are usually funded
by state or local governmental units, although some are supported by
charitable contributions, and a few have a mixture of both. The manner of selecting the defender varies from appointment by a board, commission, or official to being subject to the will of the electorate. Defender systems are most commonly found in large metropolitan jurisdictions. The older form-the assigned counsel system-operates through
the action of a judge assigning, on a case by case basis, individual members of the local bar to defend indigents. Under some assigned counsel systems, the judge selects the attorneys in rotation from a list; under
others, the judge selects them at random or from which ever of them happens to be in court at the time. Assigned counsel systems are most
commonly found in rural jurisdictions. 46
For the past several years the provision of defense services for indigents4 7 in the Bexar County District Courts (felony cases) has been
46. For the possible combinations and permutations of these two different systems,

L. SILVERSTEIN, DEFENSE OF THE POOR IN AMERICAN STATE COURTS 15-17, 39-45
(1965).
47. There are no formal criteria for determining indigency in Bexar County; the
classification of indigency depends upon the cost of the case being defended. The
see
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accomplished under an assigned counsel system whereby the judge,
through the Department of Court Administration, assigns cases to members of the local bar on a rotating basis. This system is commonly referred to as the "San Antonio Plan," although it applies to all attorneys
practicing in Bexar County. The stated purpose of the San Antonio
Plan is "to equalize the number of appointments, improve the representation of indigent defendants, and more adequately compensate attorneys accepting more than their normal number of appointments."4
Membership in the San Antonio Plan is not all inclusive. Exemptions are granted for reasons of age, disability, government employment, membership in the state legislature, and legal aid employment.
Beyond these exemptions, forty-one attorneys licensed to practice in
Bexar County cannot be located.4 9 Of the 1,359 attorneys practicing
in Bexar County, 269 are exempt, leaving a pool of 1,090. At this
point the San Antonio Plan varies from the American Bar Association's
recommendations for assigned counsel systems, which provide that
[e]very lawyer licensed to practice law in the jurisdiction, experienced and active in trial practice, and familiar with the practice
and procedure of the criminal courts should be included in the
roster of attorneys from which assignments are made.5 0
The San Antonio Plan does not differentiate between those experienced and those not-all are included in the pool. The second, and
perhaps the most unique, point at which the San Antonio Plan is at odds
with the ABA Standards is that the Plan permits an attorney to buy
his way out of participation for a yearly fee of $200, thereby avoiding
all court appointments. 5 ' In 1972, 198 attorneys, or 18 percent of
those in the pool eligible to be appointed, paid the $200 fee which went
into a fund to provide additional compensation for attorneys who have
volunteered for additional appointments.5 2 There are approximately
county classifies as indigent all defendants who file a pauper's oath. Rudy Esquivel,
Administrator, Department of Court Administration, Bexar County, private interview
held in San Antonio, Texas, on February 20, 1973. For the variations and difficulties
in the definition of indigency, see Comment, The Definition of Indigency: A ModernDay Legal Jabberwocky?, 4 ST. MARY'S L.J. 34 (1972).

48. Letter from Joe Warren Jones, President of the San Antonio Bar Association,
to all attorneys licensed to practice law in Bexar County, August 21, 1972.
49. Rudy Esquivel, Administrator, Department of Court Administration, Bexar
County, private interview held in San Antonio, Texas, on February 20, 1973.
50. ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES 26 (Approved
Draft 1968).
51. Id.; Letter from Joe Warren Jones, President of the San Antonio Bar Association, to all attorneys licensed to practice law in Bexar County, August 21, 1972.
52. Rudy Esquivel, Administrator, Department of Court Administration, Bexar

County, private interview held in San Antonio, Texas, on February 20, 1973.
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100 to 120 attorneys taking part in this bonus program." These attorneys, in addition to receiving their regularly assigned cases, are given
a bonus appointment, in rotation, whenever the name of one of the attorneys who has paid his $200 comes up in the regular rotation. The
financial advantage, in addition to the experience gained, to the bonus

plan attorney is that he not only receives his statutory fee of $50 per
appearance from the county," but also receives additional compensation based upon out-of-court time expended and the complexities of the
case.5" The amount of additional compensation paid is determined by
a committee of the San Antonio Bar Association; the money used to

compensate the bonus plan attorneys is derived from -the fund contributed 'to by the attorneys not participating in the San Antonio Plan. 6
The number and cost of assigned counsel for indigent felony
fendants are as follows. In 1972, 1,115 appointments were made
der the San Antonio Plan and 431 apcointments were made under
bonus plan.5 7 Of these 431 bonus plan appointments, claims to

deunthe
the

Bar Association for additional compensation were submitted in only 224
cases.5" The attorneys appointed in these 1,546 cases made 3,152 appearances.5" Total payments made to court appointed attorneys in
1972 amounted to $184,975.60
53. Id.
54. TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 26.05 (Supp. 1974) requires the county in
which a prosecution is initiated to compensate, out of its general fund, counsel for indigents accused of felonies or misdemeanors punishable by imprisonment. The act provides a minimum level of compensation to be paid the attorney: "For each day or fractional part thereof in court representing the accused, a reasonable fee to be set by the
court but in no event to be less than $50." Other minimum fees are set for capital cases,
appeals, and petitions for habeas corpus.
Article 26.05 has been interpreted to mean that an attorney is entitled to full compensation even though he is in court only for a part of a day. He is entitled to this
compensation for each appearance, but if he represents more than one indigent defendant in one day, he is entitled to only one day's compensation. TEx. A'y GEN. OP.
No. C-639 (1966).
55. Letter from Joe Warren Jones, President of the San Antonio Bar Association,
to all attorneys licensed to practice law in Bexar County, August 21, 1972.
56. Id.
57. Bexar County Department of Court Administration, Statistical Analysis for the
Year 1972. It is interesting to note that each attorney participating in the San Antonio
Plan received only one or two regularly assigned cases; those participating in the bonus
plan received an additional four or five cases.
58. Jimmy Allison, Executive Director of the San Antonio Bar Association, private
interview held in San Antonio, Texas, on 'March 7, 1973. The reason for the discrepancy between bonus appointments and requests for bonus compensation is due largely
to the fact that many of these cases were still pending at the end of the year.
59. Bexar County Department of Court Administration, Bexar County Statistical
Analysis for the Year 1972.
60. Id.
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In that there is such a large expenditure of attorney man-hours
and county dollars under the San Antonio Plan, it is relevant to examine
this system to see whether it is meeting the constitutional mandate of
adequate indigent defense service.
COMPARISON OF RESULTS OF RETAINED AND
ASSIGNED COUNSEL

Difficulties arise in evaluating any system of defense services by
analyzing that system in a vacuum. Due to wide differences among
states, or even within one state, in criminal procedures, prosecutorial
practices, and the criminal law itself, intrinsic standards are ill-suited
for such an undertaking. The methodology employed in this study for
determining the quality of indigent representation is that of an analytical comparison of the results of the two systems of criminal representation in Bexar County. The method by which indigents are represented
in -the criminal courts of Bexar County is the assigned counsel system.
Under this system, the presiding judge assigns members of the local
bar, in rotation, to defend indigent criminal defendants . The alternative method of representation is the retained counsel system. Under
the latter system, the defendant himself chooses and pays an attorney
to represent him.
In 1972 the District Attorney's Office filed 3,423 cases in the district courts servicing Bexar. County. 61 Of this number 2,312 were disposed of by September 1, 1973.62 Of these, 1,461 defendants were
represented by retained counsel, 763 were represented by assigned
counsel, and 88 had no attorney.61 The scope of this study includes
all felony cases which were filed by the District Attorney's Office in
61. The data were gathered by individually examining all 1972 cases on file in the
Microfilm Section of the County Clerk's Office and in the probation files of the four
criminal district courts serving Bexar County.
62. The District Attorney's Office does not classify a case as disposed of until it
has been dismissed, resulted in a finding of not guilty, or resulted in a finding of guilty
with a prison sentence imposed. If the defendant is granted probation his case is technically classified as pending until the probation is revoked or until its terms are completely fulfilled. If the probationer successfully fulfills the terms of his probation, his
case is dismissed. For the purposes of this study, the case will be considered to be disposed of if probation is granted, whether or not the defendant successfully fulfills its
terms.
63. Of the 88 cases in which the defendant had no attorney, 87 were dismissed before trial and one pleaded guilty. Most of these cases were dismissed shortly after
indictment before the defendant had employed retained counsel or had counsel appointed
for him. For this reason these cases will not be considered in the study.
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1972, defended by either retained or appointed counsel, 4 which were
disposed of by September 1, 1973.
The disposition of cases, by type of representation, is set out in
Table 1.
TABLE 1
DISPOSITION OF FELONY CASES IN BEXAR COUNTY
BY TYPE OF REPRESENTATION
Disposition

Dismissal
Of those not dismissed,
pleading guilty
Of those pleading not
guilty, acquitted
Of those found guilty,
granted probation

Retained
(1.461 cases)
Percentage
Number

Assigned
(763 cases)
Percentage
Number

640

43.8

267

35.0

744

90.6

440

88.7

37

48.1

22

44.9

510

63.9

168

35.4

Source: Microfilm Section of the Bexar County Clerk's Office and Probation Files of
the Bexar County District Courts.

These data indicate that defendants with retained attorneys are more
likely than defendants with assigned attorneys to have their cases dismissed, to be plead guilty, to be acquitted on a plea of not guilty, and
be granted probation. Not only do those defended by retained counsel
have an 8.8 percent greater likelihood of having their cases dismissed
than those defended by assigned counsel, indicating that they may be
better represented, but the type of dismissal received by those defended by retained counsel is more advantageous to the defendant. The
records of those defendants whose cases were dismissed provide eight
reasons for such action, four favorable to the defendant, four not. Dismissals favorable to the defendants are those which completely exit
them from the criminal justice system. The four reasons for such dismissals are: (1) insufficiency of the evidence; (2) complaining witness refusing to testify; (3) restitution; and (4) impending military orders to Vietnam. Unfavorable dismissals include: (1) his having
plead guilty to a misdemeanor; (2) his having been found guilty in an64. In several cases the defendant switched from retained to assigned or assigned
to retained counsel during the pendency of his case. For purposes of this study the
classification of counsel was made based upon the type of representation at the time of
disposition.
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other felony case; (3) his having been re-indicted; and (4) his death.
Table 2 reflects the causes for dismissals by type of representation.
TABLE 2
SAMPLE OF CASE DISMISSALS BY TYPE
OF REPRESENTATION
Reason for Dismissal

Evidence insufficient
Complaining witness
refused to testify
Restitution
Orders to Vietnam
Plea of guilty to a
misdemeanor
Guilty in another
felony case
Re-indicted
Death

Retained
(100 cases)
Number
Percentage

Assigned
(50 cases)
Number
Percentage

51

51

14

28

6
3
3

6
3
3

3
2
0

6
4
0

12

12

16

32

15
9
1

15
9
1

8
7
0

16
14
0

Source: Microfilm Section of the Bexar County Clerk's Office.

As the figures in Table 2 indicate, the defendants represented by retained counsel whose cases were dismissed received 68 percent favorable dismissals; those represented by assigned counsel received only 38
percent favorable dismissals. Of significance is the variance from 51
percent to 28 percent for cases dismissed due to insufficiency of evidence. A major cause for this type of dismissal is a successful motion
to suppress evidence-a definite indication of an attorney's effort and
ability. Therefore, it appears that those defended by retained counsel
received better representation than those defended by assigned counsel
based upon the frequency and type of dismissals.
A low percentage of guilty pleas can be considered to reflect a
higher quality of representation. A guilty plea may be the wisest tactical choice for a defendant in that the District Attorney's Office may
be willing to dismiss other charges, lower the charge, disregard prior
offenses on sentencing, agree to recommend a set number of years confinement, or not to oppose probation. Almost all guilty pleas result
in the District Attorneys Office giving something in return. But a
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guilty plea is not always in the best interest of the client even though
it is the easiest way for an attorney to avoid interviewing witnesses, examining the evidence, or researching the law. A guilty plea based on
lack of preparation may result in a conviction of a defendant against
whom the District Attorney's Office could not have proved a case. The
frequency of guilty pleas is the only category in which defendants with
assigned counsel fare better than those with retained counsel; however,
the statistical variance is less than 2 percent.
An acquittal in a criminal trial is frequently believed to be the
highest achievement of a criminal attorney: it requires a heavy expenditure of time to interview the accused and the witnesses, examine
the evidence, and research the law. In addition, he must be able
to organize all of this information and to present it in an effective
and articulate manner. Those defended by retained counsel were acquitted more often than ,those defended 'by assigned counsel by a rate
of 48.1 percent to 44.9 percent. Although the margin of difference
is small, it tends to indicate that those represented by retained counsel
receive slightly better representation.
A large statistical variance between the two groups is found in the
likelihood of probation being granted; those represented by retained
counsel fared better by an overwhelming rate of 63.9 percent to 35.4
percent. The granting of probation is of great importance to one convicted of a crime in that it makes the difference between confinement
and freedom. Although some commentators have argued that in the
sentencing portion of the trial an attorney can provide an important service for his client,65 the practice in Bexar County does not seem -to so
indicate. Following a conviction in Bexar County the attorney, whether
retained or assigned, requests that his client be given probation."6
This is done almost pro forma, regardless of the likelihood of it being
granted. It costs the defendant nothing, it can only help him, and it
cannot work to his disadvantage. In that the request for probation is
all but automatic, it does not seem to involve, or be a measure of, the
legal skills of the attorney.
The most dramatic method of illustrating the disparity between the
65. See Kuh, For A Meaningful Right to Counsel on Sentencing, 57 A.B.A.J. 1906,

1908 (1971). See also ABA STANDARDS, SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PROCEDURES
(Approved Draft 1968) which states that "[t]he defense attorney should recognize that
the sentencing stage is the time at which for many defendants the most important service
of the entire proceeding can be performed." Id. at 239.
66. In cases in which the defendant is going to plead guilty, it is not uncommon
to have a request by the defense attorney for a probation report before the -case goes
to trial.

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

15

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 6 [2022], No. 3, Art. 3

1974]

INDIGENT DEFENSE.

disposition of the cases of the members of these ,two groups is to examine the likelihood of each being imprisoned. Of the 763 cases in
which defendants had assigned counsel, 306, or 40.1 percent were sent
to prison. This compares with 1,461 cases in which defendants were
represented by retained counsel, of which 283, or 19.4 percent were
sent to prison. The data from this study indicate that indigent defendants are more than twice as likely to go to prison as defendants who
can afford retained counsel.
Although the data appear to indicate that indigents statistically
fare less well than -those of means in the felony courts of Bexar County,
such a variance may be due -to other differences between the members
of these groups.
When gathering 'the main body of data from 'the Microfilm Section
of the Bexar County Clerk's Office, data as to whether the defendant
was on bail or in pretrial confinement was also collected. These data
were reflective only of the defendant's status at the time of trial. Table
3 shows the relationship between pretrial detention status and case disposition for each group of defendants.
TABLE 3
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PRETRIAL STATUS AND
DISPOSITION BY TYPE OF COUNSEL
IN BEXAR COUNTY
Disposition

Convicted, prison
Convicted, probation
Not convicted
Number of defendants

Retained

Assigned
Jail

Bail

Jail

Bail

9%
39%
52%
(1098)

54%
18%
28%
(363)

9%
40%
51%
(187)

50%
16%
34%
(569)

Source: Microfilm Section of the Bexar County Clerk's Office and Probation Files of
the Bexar County District Courts.

These data demonstrate that defendants on bail, whether represented
by retained or assigned counsel have a 9 percent chance of being convicted and going to prison, a 39 to 40 percent chance of being convicted
with probation, and a 52 to 51 percent chance of being either acquitted
or having their case dismissed. Defendants in jail represented by retained counsel are sent to prison 54 percent of the time, receive probation 18 percent of the time, and are not convicted 28 percent of the
time. Similarly, defendants in jail represented by assigned counsel are
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sent to prison in 50 percent of the cases, receive probation in 16 percent of the cases, and are not convicted in 34 percent of the cases.
Therefore, it appears that the disposition of a case depends much more
upon the pretrial detention status of the accused than the type of representation he receives.
The purpose of this article was to determine the quality of indigent representation in the felony courts of Bexar County. Data taken
from all cases filed in 1972 and disposed of by September 1, 1973,
indicated that those represented by retained counsel are more likely
to have their cases dismissed, to have more favorable dismissals, to be
plead guilty, and to be acquitted on a plea of not guilty. Of the 1,461
defendants with retained counsel, 784, or 53.7 percent were found
guilty, while of the 763 defendants with assigned counsel, 467, or 61.2
percent were found guilty. Therefore, those in the assigned group are
7.5 percent more likely to be found guilty. The data also show that
of all defendants convicted 63.9 percent of those with retained counsel,
and only 35.4 percent of those with assigned counsel receive probation.
Therefore, those in the retained group are 28.5 percent more likely
to be granted probation.
One of the two most significant findings of this study is that the
San Antonio Plan does provide equal protection under law for indigent
criminal defendants. The quality of defense services, as measured by
case disposition, is almost identical for jailed defendants represented
by assigned counsel and jailed defendants represented by retained
counsel. The same was found to be the case for bailed defendants
represented by each type of counsel. The fact that assigned counsel
defendants are convicted 7.5 percent more frequently than retained
counsel defendants can be explained by noting that only 25 percent
of retained counsel defendants are in jail, while 75 percent of the assigned counsel defendants are in pretrial confinement. Again, pretrial
detention status is found to be the significant factor.
The finding that the system of assigned counsel provides adequate, that is, equal, representation in San Antonio is significant in that
such a conclusion is contrary to the prevailing view of legal commentators. The Texas Criminal Justice Council has stated that the low statutory fees received by court appointed attorneys causes many of them
to "shun appointments, and when appointed, [they] lack the incentive
to prepare properly for trial. ' '6 7 Arnold Trebach has commented that
67. Texas Criminal Justice Council, 1973 Criminal Justice Plan for Texas 111
(1973).
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the pressure of meeting office expenses, family expenses, plus the desire to get ahead may be too much to resist, causing their investigation
not to go beyond the defendant's jail cell or the district attorney's
office. 6" In addition to the lack of financial reward, Chief Justice Warren Burger has observed that many attorneys are not competent to practice law at the trial level. 69 Such criticisms are often based upon the
minimal attention given to the subjects of criminal law and evidence
in law school and on the bar examinations, as well as the high degree
of specialization and unique procedures found in the criminal courts. 70
The argument in favor of a broad based assigned counsel system with
full participation of the bar has frequently been criticized on this
basis. 7
The court appointed system of representation has been criticized
on a sociological basis for not providing quality indigent representation
due to a conflict between the attorney's self-image and what he perceives to be an undignified process. Judge Bazelon has observed that
uptown, non-criminal law specialists often experience "cultural shock"
in representing indigent criminal defendants in that their clients are
72
neither middle class nor what they would consider "deserving poor.
This view holds that not only is the client viewed with disdain, but also
the criminal court judges are considered as "professionally incompetent
and sometimes venal. The lack of decorum and the disrespect for de68. A. TREBACH, THE RATIONING OF JUSTICE: CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND THE
CRIMINAL PROCESS 138 (1964); see PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT
AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORTS: THE COURTS 58 (1967).

69. See Burger, Counsel for the Prosecution and Defense-Their Roles Under the
Minimum Standards, 8 AM. CRIM. L.Q. 2, 7-8 (1969). See also PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION

OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORTS:

THE COURTS 58 (1967); Bazelon, The Defective Assistance of Counsel, 42 U. CIN. L.
REV. 1, 11-12 (1973).
70. Finer, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 58 CORNELL L. REV. 1077, 1079-80

(1973).
71. For example, see W. Steele, The Doctrine of Right to Counsel: Its Impact on
the Administration of Criminal Justice and the Legal Profession, August, 1969 (unpublished thesis in University of Texas Law School Library), where it is observed that
it is facetious to imply that noticeable improvement will be made in criminal justice

by a smorgasbord of general practitioners and commercial specialists.

Such logic

is part of the self-serving myth that states that all ordinary lawyers are willing to
devote themselves to the cause of an indigent client. The unspoken assumption of
this myth is that the "civil lawyer" has as much skill as a "criminal lawyer" in crim-

inal cases. More rational support for this assumption would be provided if it was
conceded that many "civil lawyers" spend an abnormal amount of time preparing
for court appointed cases. If this is true, then it still appears that the appointive
method is a circuitous means of providing adequate and competent counsel to the
indigent.
Id. at 88.
72. Bazelon. The Defective Assistant of Counsel. 42 U. CiN. L. REV. 1, 12 (1973).
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fendants and defense counsel often seen in these courts confirms this
'
impression. 7
This prevailing view concerning the inferiority of assigned counsel
systems has been in large part responsible for much of the trend toward
public defender systems. A public defender system is viewed as preferable to an assigned system in that its attorneys are more likely to be
experienced in criminal practice as well as having a large collection of
legal sourcework such as pleadings, motions, and briefs. 74 A statewide study of assigned and public defender systems in North Carolina,
without data concerning pretrial detention status, concluded that for
metropolitan areas the public defender system provided a higher quality of defense at a lower cost per case. 7 1 A similar study in Texas without the benefit of case analysis has reached similar conclusions. 76 Although a cost analysis of the two systems is beyond the scope of this
study, the data and conclusions found herein do not justify the establishment of a public defender on the basis of an inferior quality of indigent
representation. 77
The results and conclusions of this study generally agree with
those of cognate studies that have approached the problem by analyzing case dispositions. Silverstein, in his nationwide study using 1962
data, found that indigents are slightly less likely to have -their cases dismissed, slightly more likely to be plead guilty, and slightly less likely
to be acquitted in a contested trial. 78 The data from Bexar County are
similar, except that -they show that those with assigned attorneys are
slightly less likely to plead guilty than those with retained counsel. Stuart S. Nagel, using Silverstein's data, concluded that indigents were
more likely to be found guilty than retained counsel defendants, and
that the disparity is due in part to the different manner of providing
73.

PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUs-

TICE, TASK FORCE REPORTS: THE COURTS 57 (1967).
74. A. LEWIS, GIDEON'S TRUMPET 198 (1964); Foster, The Public Defender and
Other Systems for Defense of Indigents, 53 J. Am.Jun. Soc'Y 247, 248 (1970).
75. Note, Analysis and Comparison of the Assigned Counsel and Public Defender
Systems, 49 N.C.L. REV. 705, 709 (1971).
76. Comment, The Texas Indigent-Counsel for His Defense: Is It Time For A
Public Defender System?, 25 BAYLOR L. REV. 55, 66-67 (1973).
77. Much of the opposition to a public defender system, at least in Texas, does not
seem to be centered upon the issue of the quality of representation, but upon a more
generalized fear of "socialized law" and "governmental paternalism." L. SILVERSTEIN,
DEFENSE OF THE POOR IN AMERICAN STATE COURTS 720 (1965); Jimmy Allison, Executive Director of the San Antonio Bar Association, private interview held in San Antonio, Texas, on March 7, 1973.
78, L. SILVERSTEIN, DEFENSE OF-THE ,PORIN*AMERICAN STATE CoURTs 27 (1965).
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representation."9 On the issue of probation, Nagel has observed that
although indigents have a higher likelihood of having prior convictions,
this difference was not so large as to explain -thedisparity -in the proportions of probation granted." The Bexar County data led to a similar
conclusion, except that pretrial detention characteristics of the two
groups seem to provide an explanation for such inequality of treatment.
Anne Rankin, using 1962 data'from Manhattan's Magistrate's Felony Court, has concluded -that pretrial confinement was most significant
as a causal factor in the determination of guilt and the likelihood of
81
probation.
TABLE 4
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PRETRIAL STATUS AND
DISPOSITION BY TYPE OF COUNSEL
IN MANHATTAN
Disposition

Sentenced to prison
Convicted without prison
Not convicted
Number of defendants

Retained
Bail

Jail

16%
40%
44%
(212)

60%
12%
28%
(40)

Assigned.
Jail
Bail

21%
28%
51%
(130)

64%
9%
27%
(306)

Source: Anne Rankin, "The Effect of PretrialDetention," 39 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 641, 651
•(1964).

Her data showed that defendants in jail had approximately the same
likelihood of not being convicted, irrespective of the type of representation, but of the defendants on bail, 51 percent of those represented
by. assigned counsel and 44 percent of those with retained counsel were
not convicted. She also found that bailed individuals with retained
counsel Were sentenced -to prison 16 percent of the time-their jailed
counterparts were sentenced -to jail 60 percent of the time. Bailed individuals with assigned counsel went to prison 21 percent of the timetheir jailed counterparts went to prison 64 percent of the time.82 The
Bexar County data are similar to that from -the Manhattan Magistrate's
79. Nagel, Disparities in Criminal Procedure, 14 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 1272, 1281-83
(1967).
80. Id. at 1282.
81. See Rankin, The Effect of Pretrial Detention, 39 N.Y.U.L. REV. 641, 650-51
(1964).
82. Id. at 651.. For a confirmation and update.of the results of this survey, conducted in somewhat greater depth, see The Unconstitutional Administration of Bail:
Bellamy v. The Judges of New York City, 8 CalM. L. BUL. 459 (1972).
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Felony Court, except that the differences in representation are even
further minimized in Bexar County.
Although the primary purpose of this article was directed at the

quality of indigent representation, significant conclusions concerning
the effect of pretrial detention seem to be in order. In Bexar County,

the decision setting the amount of bail has a very heavy impact upon
the ultimate disposition of the case. Regardless of the type of counsel, the jailed defendant is far more likely to be convicted -than those
on bail; of those convicted, jailed defendants are far more likely to be

sent to prison. 3
Several causes for such a disparity in -the disposition of jailed and
bailed defendants have been suggested.

Jailed defendants are under

heavy pressure to plead guilty even when they are not guilty8" or have
an arguable defense,

5

if only so that they may be transferred from the

squalid conditions of local jails to the better facilities maintained by most
state prison authorities.

nesses in his

behalf,8 6

A jailed defendant is unable to seek out wit-

and if he does go to trial, his demeanor and psy-

chological state work to his disadvantage.

7

Finally, if the defendant

should be convicted, his chance of receiving probation is decreased due
to his unemployment. 8
Although the primary question of this article has been answered,
the significance of pretrial detention in the criminal justice process
leaves much study yet to be done. Further inquiry into the law and
practice of bail procedures would seem to be indicated. 9 If the con83. See Table 3 p. 601 supra.
84. Fabricant, Bail as a Preferred Freedom and the Failures of New York's Revi.
sion, 18 BUF. L. REV. 303, 304-305 (1969).
85. Id. at 304-305; Note, An Answer to the Problem of Bail: A Proposal in Need
of Empirical Confirmation, 9 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROB. 394, 399 (1973).
86. Fabricant, Bail as a Preferred Freedom and the Failures of New York's Revision, 18 BUF. L. REV. 303 (1969); Wald, Pretrial Detention and Ultimate Freedom:
A Statistical Study, 39 N.Y.U.L. REV. 631, 632-33 (1964); Note, An Answer to the
Problem of Bail: A Proposalin Need of Empirical Confirmation, 9 COLUM. J.L. & Soc.
PROB.

394, 400 (1973).

87. Fabricant, Bail as a Preferred Freedom and the Failures of New York's Revision, 18 BUF. L. REV. 303, 305 (1969); Wald, PretrialDetention and Ultimate Freedom:
A Statistical Study, 39 N.Y.U.L. REV. 631, 632 (1964); Note, An Answer to the Problem of Bail: A Proposal in Need of Empirical Confirmation, 9 COLUM. J.L. & Soc.
PROB..

394, 401 (1973).

88. Fabricant, Bail as a Preferred Freedom and the Failures of New York Revision, 18 BUF. L. REV. 303, 305-306 (1969); Wald, PretrialDetention and Ultimate Freedom: A StatisticalStudy, 39 N.Y.U.L. REV. 631, 632 (1964).
89. An excellent beginning on this subject in the State of Texas is provided by
Teague, The Administration of Bail and PretrialFreedom in Texas, 43 TEXAS L. REV.
356 (1965). For a discussion of methodological difficulties in studying the problem of
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clusions reached in this study are borne out by future research, a major
reform of the bail system would appear to be justified. 90
the effects of pretrial detention on the outcome of a criminal case, see Hindelang, On
the MethodologicalRigor of the Bellamy Memorandum, 8 CRIM. L. BUL. 507 (1972).

90. For various approaches to reform, see R.

GOLDFARB, RANSOM:

A

CRITIQUE OF

THE AMERICAN BAIL SYSTEM 150-212 (1965); Levin, The San Francisco Bail Project,
55 A.B.A.J. 135 (1969); Bogomolny & Gaus, An Evaluation of the Dallas PretrialRelease Project, 26 Sw. L.J. 510 (1972); Botein, The Manhattan Bail Project: Its Impact
on Criminology and the CriminalLaw Process, 43 TEXAS L REV. 319 (1965).
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